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Abstract 
In this article I critically discuss Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun’s 
reflections on the proper final ends of doing philosophy and related sorts of 
abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry. Professor Balogun appears to 
argue that one should undertake philosophical studies only insofar as they are 
likely to make a practical difference to people’s lives, particularly by 
contributing to politico-economic development, or, in other words, that one 
should eschew seeking knowledge for its own sake. However, there is one line 
of thought from Professor Balogun, about philosophy being able to make life 
meaningful, that I argue ultimately––perhaps contrary to his intentions––
entails that it can be appropriate to some degree to pursue philosophy that is 
unlikely to ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. My central aims in this 
article are to identify Professor Balogun’s strongest argument against pursuing 
any knowledge for its own sake and to argue that an appeal to meaningfulness 
constitutes a strong, competing reason to seek out some of it.  
Keywords: Development, Higher Education, Knowledge for Its Own Sake, 
Meaning of Life, Meta-philosophy, Poverty, Social Relevance 
 
Background: Theory Only for the Sake of Practice? 
Is it appropriate to do philosophy, or a similar kind of intellectual engagement, 
insofar as it is unlikely to make a practical difference in people’s lives? When 
so many people are poor, unemployed, oppressed, unhealthy, uneducated, and 
are so particularly on the African continent, can it be justified for a scholar 
based there to spend his time discovering knowledge for its own sake, and for 
a public university to pay him to do so?  
 Notice that these questions are not about whether philosophy or 
another kind of abstract, speculative, or theoretical inquiry could help to 
improve the quality of people’s lives. Professor Oladele Abiodun Balogun has 
argued––convincingly, to my mind––that such reflection not merely can make 
a practical difference, but often is essential in order to do so (2008a, 2013, 24, 
27, 32, 51). For example, Professor Balogun points out that philosophers are 
particularly well positioned to advance developmental ideals (2008a, 107-
109), criticize ideologies (2008a, 109-110), sift through traditional beliefs and 
practices in order to recover promising ones and leave unpromising ones 
behind (2008a, 110-111, 113-114), and help orient scientific inquiry and 
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technological products in the service of genuine values (2008a, 112-113; see 
also 2013, 27-49).  
I accept these points from Professor Balogun, which amount to saying 
that philosophers and related kinds of thinkers could do a lot of good when it 
comes to “the socio-political exigencies of the moment” (BALOGUN 2008a, 
107). I also accept another claim from Professor Balogun, that philosophers 
and similar inquirers should do a lot of good in that respect, much more than 
they have up to now (BALOGUN 2008a, 2008b, 2013). What I still wonder 
about, however, is whether philosophers should only strive to do a lot of this 
sort of good, or whether it can be appropriate for them also to spend some time 
and resources theorizing for the sake of purely epistemic ends, such as 
understanding human nature and our world.  
Concretely, is it all right for those of us in Africa to inquire into logic 
(say, of the mathematical sort), the philosophy of language (e.g., when it 
comes to the nature of linguistic reference), or metaphysics, for instance in 
respect of the nature of causation, numbers, or essences, when doing so is 
unlikely to improve people’s quality of life? I accept that some aspects of these 
inquiries have a chance of improving people’s quality of life beyond epistemic 
contributions. However, it is implausible to think that all aspects of them do, 
and insofar as intellectual enquiry is unlikely to foster socio-economic 
development, I label its pursuit “knowledge for its own sake.” The question, 
then, is whether we in an African context are unjustified in pursuing some 
knowledge for its own sake, that is, whether we should categorically avoid 
engaging in any philosophy, or more broadly systematic thought, that is 
unexpected to help when it comes to practice. To be very concrete, should a 
researcher based in Africa stop publishing on whether water is essentially the 
intrinsic, chemical property of H20 or instead is constituted by how it relates to 
other beings in an ecosystem? Or should a lecturer there no longer discuss in 
the classroom, say, whether the universe had a temporal beginning? 
Professor Balogun’s writings most often suggest that it would be 
wrong ever to pursue knowledge for its own sake, for instance when he says 
that “the task of African philosophers in contemporary times should be 
resonantly guided by African social exigencies, especially as defined by the 
questionable human condition in Africa” (2013, 52).1 If that is the task––
notice he does not say “a” task––for those of us working in the African 
philosophical tradition or doing philosophy while living in Africa, then for us 
 
1 Professor Balogun is not the only one in the African tradition to contend that the ultimate 
point of knowledge should be to improve people’s quality of life. He himself quotes 
OLADIPO (1992) and NWAKAEZE-OGUGUA (2006), and we could add, for some more 
examples, DOWLING and SEEPE (2003); ADAMS (2005, 144); NABUDERE (2006); and 
MATOLINO (2018). In a critical survey of dozens of works by African thinkers on the 
point of higher education, I could not find one that extolled knowledge for its own sake 
(METZ 2009a; see also METZ 2009b). It might be, however, that Léopold Senghor would, 
upon reflection, do so (see SENGHOR 1964, 47, 79). 
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no more inquiry into what the nature of water is or whether the universe has 
existed forever. 
However, in at least one discussion, I believe Professor Balogun 
provides an argumentative strategy the logic of which leaves some space for us 
to pursue knowledge for its own sake. According to this line of thought, 
philosophy is properly concerned with what Professor Balogun refers to as our 
“existential” status or the “meaningfulness” of our lives. I argue that prizing 
this value ultimately––perhaps contrary to Professor Balogun’s intentions––
entails that it can be appropriate to do some philosophy that is unlikely to 
ameliorate poverty and similar social ills. 
In the next section of the article I expound what I see as three distinct 
arguments Professor Balogun advances against pursuing any knowledge for its 
own sake. In catchwords, they appeal to the particularity of social context, the 
concept of an educated person, and the implications of a communal ethic. I 
provide reason to doubt the first two rationales, but accept that the last one, 
which explicitly appeals to characteristically African moral values, is strong.  
In the following section I address the existential orientation of some 
of Professor Balogun’s thinking, which is relatively unique in professional 
African philosophy. It is only a handful of African philosophers who (when 
writing in English) have explicitly invoked life’s meaning as a key value (e.g., 
SINDIMA 1989, 544-548; DZOBO 1992, 227-230; GBADEGESIN 1991, 58; 
IGBAFEN 2017).2 I work to flesh out a plausible approach to what makes life 
meaningful and to show that it supports some kinds of intellectual inquiry that 
are not expected to make a practical difference in people’s lives.  
In a further section, I weigh up Professor Balogun’s moral argument 
against knowledge for its own sake against my meaning argument for it, 
arguing that the best understanding of morality includes a concern to advance 
meaning in people’s lives. It follows that there is moral reason of some 
strength to promote understanding of the human condition apart from any 
further, beneficial consequences.  
In the concluding section of the article, I note some limitations of the 
argumentation advanced here. I point out that, given the current state of the 
debate, it is not yet clear that it was indeed right for me to have composed this 
article—itself an instance of knowledge for its own sake, reflection that is 
unlikely to improve anyone’s quality of life. 
 
Questioning Knowledge for Its Own Sake 
In Professor Balogun’s corpus I detect three distinct arguments against the 
view that a philosopher (or similar inquirer) should ever seek out knowledge 
that is unlikely to improve people’s quality of life, non-epistemically 
understood principally in terms of politico-economic development. They 
 
2 For some of the few in African philosophy who have expressly and systematically 
concerned themselves with life’s meaning, see ATTOE (unpublished); and METZ 
(unpublished). 
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appeal respectively to the particularity of social context, the concept of an 
educated person, and the implications of a communal ethic, and in this section 
I address them in this order, providing reason to doubt the first two arguments 
but also to think that the third is formidable and not easily overcome.  
The most salient argument against knowledge for its own sake in 
Professor Balogun’s writings involves an appeal to social context. The basic 
idea is that the function philosophy should serve depends on the society in 
which it is located. For someone engaging with the philosophy that has grown 
out of African culture and is set in a certain environment, or for a philosopher 
who is living with Africans, the form that her philosophy should take should 
be determined by that culture and environment.3 Professor Balogun has 
appealed to this consideration in at least two major essays to draw the 
conclusion that philosophy in Africa should have a strictly practical 
orientation: 
  
The point here is that philosophy develops from context, and no 
philosophy exists in a vacuum….The dismal condition of living in 
Africa, marked by bad governance, poverty, conflict, lack of scientific 
knowledge, under-development, and injustice, is among the socio-
political exigencies that should define the philosopher's task on the 
continent….The duty of the philosopher, then, is to theorize on how to 
reorder the political values and institutions for the reconstruction of 
the present and determine how to design a new future. (BALOGUN 
2008a, 107; see also 114)   
 
To affirm philosophy as a “social-epochal expression” is to express 
the anti-thesis of the perennial nature of philosophy….In relation to 
the African situation, there is a dismal condition of living in all 
spheres of social structure….(I)s a philosophy rooted in an African 
culture a means to an improved human condition in contemporary 
times or an exercise in pure abstraction?....In as much as the content 
and direction of every philosophy is historically and socially 
conditioned, philosophy in Africa should be resonantly guided by 
African social exigencies. (BALOGUN 2013, 15, 21, 23, 30; see also 
29, 33) 
This reasoning suggests that it could in principle be right for those outside the 
African context to pursue some knowledge for its own sake. Perhaps it is 
appropriate for European philosophers to undertake some inquiries unlikely to 
 
3 By “African philosophers,” “philosophy in Africa,” and similar phrases, I presume that 
Professor Balogun means either someone working in the African tradition but who might 
not be living on the continent (one doing African philosophy), or someone living on the 
continent even if not doing African philosophy (one doing philosophy in Africa). I gather 
he means to exclude a person of African descent doing, say, Confucian philosophy in 
China. 
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improve anyone’s quality of life, say, because European society is politico-
economically well developed or because European people appreciate that sort 
of reflection. However, for Professor Balogun, it would be wrong for African 
philosophers to do so—notice how he speaks of “the” (not “a”) task and “the” 
duty of the philosopher in Africa to advance development.4 
Notice that Professor Balogun is not suggesting that philosophers stop 
doing philosophy and become political activists. He is clear that the 
abstraction, the questioning, and the theory that are characteristic of 
philosophy should continue, but that they should be put to good use for 
improving people’s quality of life (e.g., 2008a, 112, 114-115; 2013, 52). In 
fact, Professor Balogun believes that often the best way for philosophers to 
improve people’s quality of life is not to aim directly for that practical 
outcome, and instead to concentrate on intellectual matters.5 Note that this 
belief does not mean Professor Balogun approves of seeking out knowledge 
that is in fact unlikely to improve people’s quality of life or thinks that 
epistemic considerations can be sufficient to pursue a certain sort of study.  
Similarly, Professor Balogun need not be understood as maintaining 
that all logicians, philosophers of language, and metaphysicians should switch 
to becoming moral and political philosophers. Instead, I presume the present 
argument would entail that they should just do the sort of logic, philosophy of 
language, and metaphysics that would help to “reorder the political values and 
institutions”. That could well include critical thinking, reflecting on the nature 
of slurs and other insults, and inquiring into social ontology. 
My concern with this argument is that just because culture and 
environment more broadly do influence philosophical reflection in certain 
ways, it does not follow that they should. After all, consider apartheid society 
in South Africa. Surely philosophers there should not have done whatever they 
could to help impose Afrikaaner and more generally Western culture and to 
facilitate the neglect, if not denigration, of indigenous cultures. Apartheid 
society influenced “the content and direction” of the philosophy done in South 
Africa at the time, but it did so in undesirable ways. What this example is 
meant to show is that it is not necessarily true that a philosophy should be 
molded by its social context or by the dominant forces in it.  
Indeed, philosophy has an important task of evaluating the culture and 
environment in which it is located, not uncritically accepting them. That is, in 
fact, a point that Professor Balogun clearly accepts in his writings—the title of 
his inaugural lecture, “Philosophy in an African Culture: A Light in the 
Darkness” is meant to point out that not all aspects of culture merit retaining. 
However, I believe the implication of the point is that we cannot directly infer 
what the function of philosophy should be from the fact that it is “historically 
and socially conditioned,” or from the fact (if it is one) that there is no pure 
reason operating independently of empirical influences. We also have to think, 
 
4 However, there are times when he speaks more loosely, e.g., of the “primary” task of 
African philosophers (BALOGUN 2008a, 106).  
5 This somewhat stronger position was expressed in conversation with the author. 
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philosophically, about whether that society has been structured justly and 
otherwise desirably, and about what the proper role of philosophy is in that 
society. We have to determine which “social exigencies” count, or perhaps 
what count as “social exigencies” in the first place.  
So, Professor Balogun needs additional premises, I submit, beyond 
what have been mentioned so far, in order to draw the conclusion he wants. In 
particular, it would be useful for him to have some moral or other normative 
propositions with which to specify the proper role of philosophy in a given 
social context. Although I do not see that he is explicit about ethical claims in 
his work specifically on the relevance of philosophy (BALOGUN 2008a, 
2013), he is in other essays, and it would be revealing to draw on them, as I do 
below.  
A second argument from Professor Balogun’s body of writings 
advanced to rebut the propriety of pursuing knowledge for its own sake 
appeals to the concept of an educated person. The core idea is that an educated 
person is essentially a good citizen, not a bookish recluse. 
 
In the African culture, the concept of an “educated person” is broader 
since there is no such distinction between the “educated person” and 
the “ideal citizen”, as we have in Western culture….(A)fter an 
educational experience (whether formal, informal or non-formal), it is 
expected that the educated should be able to turn his or her acquired 
skill and knowledge into a citizenship service….(The) emphasis on 
the intrinsic value of knowledge and other related experiences shows 
again, the point of divergence between the African understanding of 
an educated person and the Western conceptual model. (BALOGUN 
2008b, 122, 123, 124) 
 
Professor Balogun’s claim is that, in contrast to a Western conception of the 
educated person as one who is isolated, reads a lot, has completed exams, has 
acquired certificates from an authority, and values knowledge intrinsically, in 
the African tradition an educated person is essentially, amongst other things, 
socially engaged, able to speak to people, and puts her knowledge to use for 
others.6 
Although Professor Balogun speaks here of what education means for 
indigenous African society in contrast to the modern West, he can be sensibly 
read as making a stronger claim, namely, that social contribution is inherent to 
the best understanding anywhere of what a truly educated person is. For one, 
Professor Balogun forcefully notes that education is not the mere apprehension 
 
6 In another essay Professor Balogun critically reflects on the views of two African theorists 
of education, and advises combining the one that “has the potential to open African 
societies to the wider horizon of science and technology” with the other that “has the 
capacity to inculcate into pupils the intellectual, moral and democratic values prerequisite 
for good citizenship” (BALOGUN 2009a, 71). The strictly pragmatic orientation is clear.  
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of facts demonstrated by passing written assessments in a dedicated school 
building, for “there are some people in both Western and African cultures who 
have never seen the four-walls of a school, to receive formal education, yet 
they are educated” (BALOGUN 2008b, 124).  
For another, Professor Balogun’s point is strengthened by invoking 
the concept of wisdom, as he occasionally does (2008b, 122, 124) and as 
Kwasi Wiredu (2004, 18-19) has. An education, properly understood, is 
plausibly identified as the development of wisdom, which has an essentially 
practical dimension. A wise person is intuitively captured by the way 
Professor Balogun describes an educated person: “one who shows evidence of 
a well-integrated personality, meaning being economically prudent, socially 
and politically competent, morally acceptable and intellectually and culturally 
sophisticated” (BALOGUN 2008b, 124).  
It is therefore not merely those inclined toward indigenous African 
worldviews who should take seriously the suggestion that a person is educated 
insofar as she is wise or is a good citizen. If we now add the premise that the 
proper function of a public university is to develop educated people, which 
certainly seems right, then we can draw the conclusion that philosophy and 
knowledge pursuit more generally there must advance good citizenship, and 
not be pursued for their intrinsic, epistemic value. 
It is undoubtedly true that it is possible to be an educated person 
without having acquired, let alone valued, knowledge for its own sake of the 
sort I am discussing in this article. It is also undoubtedly true that one would 
be an educated person if one were the sort of person that Professor Balogun 
describes. In brief, knowledge for its own sake is not necessary for education, 
while good citizenship is sufficient for education. I am even inclined to accept 
that good citizenship is necessary for being a fully (or genuinely) educated 
person. Professor Balogun advances all these claims, and they are convincing.  
It does not follow from these claims, however, that education is not 
constituted in part by knowledge for its own sake. That is, it could still be the 
case, for all that has been said so far, that one would be more educated to some 
degree, the more one knew about abstract, speculative, and theoretical matters 
that are unlikely to improve people’s quality of life.  
And that, I submit, is true. It is true that one way to be educated is to 
learn about, say, the nature of causation or the origin of the universe. It is not 
the only way to be educated, and one is not completely (or even adequately) 
educated if that is all one knows. However, some knowledge for its own sake 
is intuitively part of what it means to be educated. After all, suppose a 
philosopher or cosmologist came to discover with substantial evidence what 
the origin the universe was—it would be right for his university to honor him 
in virtue of his education (and, furthermore to do so not insofar as the 
discovery is likely to improve people’s health, advance democracy, or 
anything else pragmatic, on which see METZ 2010, 541-543).  
Now, if one sort of education consists of knowledge for its own sake, 
then we cannot appeal merely to the concept of an educated person in order to 
determine whether it is right for those at a public university to pursue 
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knowledge for its own sake or not. There are different types of education, 
some oriented toward practical ends and others toward epistemic ones, 
meaning that we must choose which types are the most important or otherwise 
merit pursuit. For that (as with the first argument explored above) some moral 
or other normative considerations would be particularly useful for prioritizing 
the various conceptions of an educated person.  
That brings me to the third argument against knowledge for its own 
sake that is suggested by Professor Balogun’s writings. This argument is 
explicitly a moral one, and so promises to fill in the gaps that I maintained are 
present in the previous two arguments, regarding how a philosopher should 
respond to social context and which sort of education is most desirable. 
Basically, according to the present argument, one plausible strand of African 
thought about morality entails that it would be immoral to devote time, money, 
and other resources to inquiry that is unlikely to make a practical difference in 
people’s lives.  
In some of his works, Professor Balogun draws on a relational 
interpretation of Yoruba ethics to address contemporary issues. For example, 
in one article he says, according to the Yoruba people, “Social crimes are 
directed against individuals who ultimately upset the societal harmony” 
(BALOGUN 2009b, 47; see also mention of “communalism” and 
“equilibrium” in BALOGUN 2013, 37, 39). Supposing that social crimes are 
invariably ways of treating others immorally, we can derive the principle that 
an act is immoral (at least characteristically) in virtue of being discordant, that 
is, disrupting harmonious relationships.  
In another article, Professor Balogun sketches a moral perspective 
with which to evaluate Nigerian politics. Here he says of Yoruba ethics that it 
is “characterized as being community-centred. The communal values of the 
Yoruba are anchored in the notion of common will (the common or public 
interest)” (BALOGUN 2015, 7). Like some other interpretations of the 
common good, Professor Balogun maintains that it consists of a balance 
between the interests of the individual and those of others in her society 
(BALOGUN 2015, 7) and that it includes “the self-determination of a people” 
(BALOGUN 2015, 9). Elsewhere in this essay Professor Balogun speaks of 
moral paradigms including “respect for human life and dignity, fostering 
communal humane bonds, and formation of virtuous habits” (BALOGUN 
2015, 10), and he says that “society should emphasize the value of hard work, 
diligence, self-reliance, and the importance of acquiring character traits such 
as honesty and social responsibility” (BALOGUN 2015, 10).  
Now, here is the rub: it appears that none of the above descriptions of 
morality entails that one should pursue knowledge for its own sake, whereas 
they do tend to prescribe doing what would improve people’s quality of life. 
First off, it might be that addressing the nature of causation and the origin of 
the universe would be, if not discordant, then at least not sufficiently 
harmonious, in the sense of inappropriately isolating oneself and failing to be 
concerned with others’ well-being. Second, the common good would not be 
adequately advanced by pursuing knowledge for its own sake, since, by 
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definition, it is unlikely to improve people’s health, advance justice, reduce 
poverty, and the like. Third, people will be in no greater position to “take their 
lives….into their own hands” (BALOGUN 2015, 9) if academics study certain 
types of logic, philosophy of language, or metaphysics; these inquiries would 
not support democratic self-governance. Fourth, it does not appear that respect 
for human life and its dignity demands the study of theory that will make no 
practical difference, whereas such respect instead seems to prescribe doing 
what it takes to save lives. Fifth, the specific virtues that Professor Balogun 
mentions, viz., of hard work, self-reliance, honesty, and social responsibility, 
are more likely to be developed and manifested in the context of pursuing 
pragmatic knowledge, not knowledge for its own sake.  
I believe this is the strongest argument in Professor Balogun’s 
writings for thinking that it would be wrong for an African philosopher or 
philosopher in Africa to do philosophy of a sort that is not socially relevant. 
Notice how appealing to these moral considerations would strengthen the other 
two arguments explored above. With regard to the idea that every philosophy 
is a product of its culture and environment, the present rationale entails that a 
philosopher should work to improve his society in the morally relevant ways 
above. And when it comes to which sort of education would be most desirable 
to advance, the present rationale entails that member of a university ought to 
promote the sort essential to being a good citizen.  
 Before evaluating this argument, I expound what I see as another, 
existential line of thinking in Professor Balogun’s work, one that, I contend, 
upon reflection supports an opposite conclusion to the effect that some 
knowledge for its own sake is appropriate. After spelling out this reasoning in 
support of knowledge for its own sake, I weigh it against Professor Balogun’s 
moral rationale against it. 
 
Knowledge for Its Own Sake as a Source of Meaning in Life 
The primary message that I get from reading Professor Balogun’s 
philosophical reflections is that philosophy and similar kinds of inquiry should 
invariably serve a practical function, but there is one strand of reasoning that is 
different, at least upon some refinement. There are occasions when Professor 
Balogun uses the language of “existential” or “meaningful” matters, which 
terms differ from the mention of “social” or “political” interests. In this 
section, I first indicate what Professor Balogun says about the former matters, 
and then appeal to them to develop a clear and promising rationale for thinking 
that some knowledge for its own sake would be appropriate to pursue. 
 It is a striking fact about works in African philosophy that there is 
very little written specifically about what can make life meaningful. Professor 
Balogun is in fact one of the few to mention the concept explicitly, and he 
does so particularly in his inaugural lecture (2013). Professor Balogun does 
not explicitly define “meaningfulness” and cognate terms, but I presume we 
both have in mind conditions of life for which reactions of esteem or 
admiration would be fitting, or that involve purposes that particularly merit 
pursuit and are higher than feeling pleasure or satisfying desires (on which see, 
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e.g., METZ 2013, 24-35). Looking back on your life from your deathbed, what 
was it about your life in which you could reasonably take substantial pride, or 
what was worth more than the mental well-being you enjoyed? Answering 
those questions involves making judgments of meaning in life.  
Most often Professor Balogun maintains that the under-development 
in the political-economic realm or otherwise poor quality of life so widespread 
in Africa is what renders life meaningless, so that meaning would, conversely, 
come from practically helping others live better lives (e.g., 2013, 22-23, 27, 
28, 39, 46). However, there are other places where Professor Balogun seems to 
say that considerations of meaning in life are not exhausted by social matters 
and that philosophers should address considerations of meaning as apparently 
distinct from them. Consider the following remarks:  
 
(C)ulture in a broad dimension essentially entails our general mode of 
making meaning out of existence and ways of living….(E)very 
philosophy is a philosophy of culture. (BALOGUN 2013, 7, 18)  
 
I however consider philosophy to be indispensably relevant not only 
to society, but also to meaningful human existence….Philosophy 
involves a rational inquiry into how we make meaning of existence in 
human culture. (BALOGUN 2013, 27) 
 
(T)he apparent disinterestedness of funding agencies in conceptual, 
reflective, normative or speculative researches which are common 
places in the Humanities should be overcome in order to realize, in the 
near future, the existential implications of researches in philosophy. 
(BALOGUN 2013, 53) 
The first and second quotations say that philosophy is squarely about how to 
make life meaningful, while a plain reading of the second quotation also 
suggests that social matters are one thing and that meaning is another 
(presumably broader) thing, and the third quotation contends that philosophy, 
insofar as it addresses issues of meaning, merits funding (and surely other 
resources, too). These ideas occasion awareness of the position that one major 
point of philosophy is to inquire into and advance meaning in life, which is not 
reducible to social matters and merits support. I presume that if meaning in life 
is not reducible to satisfying people’s interests, and that philosophy should 
concern itself with meaning, then there is something of epistemic value about 
philosophy that merits pursuit.  
I am not sure that this is what Professor Balogun had in mind, and, 
indeed, I doubt it, given how much more frequently he associates what is 
meaningful with what would improve people’s quality of life. His dominant 
perspective is clearly expressed here:  
 
The view that philosophy is purely theoretical without influence on 
practical or existential human existence is problematic, because 
philosophers shape the society and indeed the future by changing 
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people's beliefs and habits of thought, which in turn affect their 
actions….Without philosophical consideration, life is without 
meaning. (BALOGUN 2013, 27)  
In contrast, in the rest of this section I argue that the appeal to meaningfulness, 
as a concept distinct from the concepts of social context, educated person, and 
moral virtue, grounds a strong defense of the idea that academics should 
devote some energy to pursuing certain kinds of knowledge for its own sake. 
Roughly, although much meaning surely comes from action done for the 
betterment of society, not all of it must; some meaning can come from 
cognition alone.  
I begin to support the idea that meaning in life is not exhausted by 
improving others’ quality of life with some non-epistemic examples, before 
turning to epistemic ones. Probably most long-standing cultures around the 
world do, with Professor Balogun, place helping interpersonal relationships at 
the center of meaning in life. However, many will have intuitions that there are 
additional ways to confer some meaning on one’s existence. For a first cluster 
of examples, consider some virtues that do not seem essentially other-
regarding. Think of courage, strength of will, patience, creativity, and self-
love. Someone who exhibits these traits, or who at least has worked to 
cultivate them, plausibly has grounds for esteem, that is, for feeling good 
about herself, and others would have good reason to admire her for them, 
which are reliable markers of meaningfulness. 
The positive responses many of us are inclined to have toward 
someone who exhibits these kinds of traits are not due merely to the fact that 
they might prompt her to treat others morally. Instead, they seem desirable to 
many even when they have no bearing on others’ welfare. One way to see this 
is to conduct a thought experiment. Imagine a person shipwrecked on a 
deserted island who initially believes against all the evidence that he will be 
rescued soon, runs in terror from the wild warthogs, makes do with an 
undecorated cave for shelter, gets addicted to an indigenous plant, and hates 
himself. Now, in contrast, imagine that this person has successfully accepted 
that rescue is unlikely, striven to battle the warthogs with courage, fashioned a 
shelter using trees in a creative way, shaken off his addiction, and become 
compassionate toward himself. Surely, the meaningfulness of his life has 
increased over time, despite not having been in a position to help others.  
One plausible way to sum up many of these sources of meaning is in 
terms of practical reason. A number of them are ways of judging in the light of 
rational reflection and then choosing on that basis, as opposed to letting one’s 
feelings and emotions govern one’s life without mediation. Now, if practical 
reason can be a source of meaning in life, considered apart from the function 
of improving others’ quality of life, then so can theoretical reason.  
Before considering how cognition in itself can be a source of 
meaning, note first how it can sometimes undercut meaning. There is 
something sad about members of Heaven’s Gate, a cult in the United States 
whose members killed themselves in the belief that only suicide would take 
them to a spacecraft trailing the Hale-Bopp Comet that would, in turn, carry 
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them to paradise. Or consider schizophrenics who incorrectly think that the 
devil is controlling their lives. The reaction of pity that I presume the reader 
has is well explained (in part) by the idea that false beliefs about the 
fundamental nature of our environment reduce the meaningfulness of a life. Of 
course, the false beliefs in these cases are expected to lead to bad choices, but 
the lack of meaning, I submit, is not simply a function of the latter. In addition, 
a person’s life is less meaningful to some degree, the more he fails to 
understand, and especially the more he is misguided about, the fundamentals 
of the world in which he lives. 
Conversely, acquiring true beliefs about the basic nature of reality 
plausibly enhances meaning in life. It is this principle that best explains the 
importance of Albert Einstein’s life for having made discoveries about light, 
energy, gravity, space-time, and black holes. It is true that these discoveries 
have made some practical differences, including enabling scientists to position 
satellites accurately. However, these influences on people’s quality of life fail 
to capture the significance of Einstein’s insights adequately. Even before 
anyone could foresee how they would benefit people, many would have 
deemed them meaningful simply by virtue of clarifying so much about how 
the physical world operates. Now we know that space and time are not fields 
that are uniform across the universe, but instead that they are affected by the 
mass of objects, so that, near extremely heavy bodies, space can warp and time 
can slow down. Similar remarks apply to the insights of Copernicus; his life 
was plausibly meaningful for having reasonably posited that the earth revolves 
around the sun, and not the other way around.  
For yet another example, consider that Charles Darwin’s systematic 
defense of human evolution is important not so much because it has fostered 
politico-economic development, if it did that at all, but more because of what 
it has taught us about the origin and nature of our species. It is one thing to 
think that God created us as a species distinct from other species all in one go, 
and another to think that we evolved from other hominids through a series of 
mutations over millions of years (a process that may have been started by 
God). I think that, if you believe the former is true, then you have false beliefs 
(or at least unjustified ones in the face of a compelling fossil record)––but set 
that matter aside. We can at least agree that whichever of us has knowledge of 
the basic features of human race has a somewhat more meaningful life than the 
one who holds false or unjustified beliefs about that, and simply in virtue of 
the object of the beliefs.  
It is not just physics and biology that offer meaningful revelations 
about the nature of ourselves, our world, and our place in the world; 
philosophy probably does, too. For example, it is important to have learned 
that David Hume was in all likelihood incorrect that causation is reducible to 
contiguity. For another example, it is significant for Saul Kripke and Hilary 
Putnam to have made the strong case that the way our words refer to physical 
things is not by the latter exhibiting features we mentally associate with the 
former, but instead through certain “causal” processes. For a third, although 
conclusively ascertaining “where morality comes from,” i.e., whether it is a 
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supernatural, non-natural, or natural property, might not change the content of 
our moral beliefs (and hence not influence our decisions), it would be an 
important discovery all the same, revealing something deep about our species.  
  In sum, I agree with Professor Balogun that one major point of doing 
philosophy and similar kinds of inquiry is to foster meaning in people’s lives. 
However, where I probably disagree with him is about how philosophy can 
confer meaning. Most often he suggests that philosophy’s way to make 
people’s lives meaningful is by facilitating beneficent action, for instance, by 
contributing to social development. However, I have argued that there are 
additional ways for philosophy and other types of knowledge pursuit to 
enhance meaning, namely, simply in virtue of epistemic considerations. 
Thinking about the right sort of thing (roughly, what is fundamental to human 
beings and our world) and in the right sort of way (roughly, by understanding) 
itself can be a real source of meaning. If so, then there is a strong case in favor 
of seeking some knowledge for its own sake. 
 This rationale in favor of knowledge for its own sake differs from 
other, more prominent ones that have been offered. For example, some have 
argued that knowledge that appears unlikely to make a practical difference to 
people’s lives often ends up doing so in unforeseeable ways (e.g., MAKGOBA 
1998, 47; IKPE 2010, 534-535; FLEXNER 2017), while others have 
maintained that pursuing knowledge for its own sake makes one more inclined 
to seek out the truth and hence stand up to power in the service of justice (e.g., 
HIGGINS 2000). I believe these are weak arguments (see METZ 2009b, 
2010), but, rather than try to show that here, I note that an appeal to meaning, 
suggested by Professor Balogun’s work, is under-developed and promising as 
a way to explain why some thinking is good in itself.7 
 
Meaning versus Morality? 
Here is where the debate stands. On the one hand, Professor Balogun believes 
that moral values are squarely a function of treating others respectfully and in 
ways that are likely to make their lives go well. These values, which include 
promoting the common good and facilitating self-governance, on the face of it 
provide no reason to pursue knowledge for its own sake at a public university 
and instead to engage in only that inquiry that is likely to make a practical 
difference. On the other hand, Professor Balogun and I both think that one 
proper job of philosophical and related kinds of thinking is to foster meaning 
in life, while I have further argued that one way that they can do so is simply 
in virtue of the sort of thought involved. How, then, to adjudicate between 
these two positions? What in the final analysis should an academic study, 
given the conflict between the two values of morality and meaning?  
 I seek to reduce some of the tension by offering Professor Balogun a 
reason to revise his morality, if he does not already accept the following. He 
 
7 Cf. METZ (2013, 229-230, 2018, 177). 
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clearly believes, as I do, that meaning is an important value that can be 
exhibited in a person’s life. If so, then I submit that an attractive account of 
morally right action would not disregard it. In addition to advancing people’s 
well-being (happiness) and their personhood (virtue), a plausible morality 
would instruct an agent to promote meaning in others’ lives. That goes not 
merely at the individual level, but also at the collective, where organizations 
such as governments and businesses are in such a large position to enhance, or 
conversely detract from, what makes life meaningful (for some discussion, see 
METZ 2016). 
 Yoruba ethics, and African moralities more generally, are not 
normally understood in this way. Usually the focus of a sub-Saharan account 
of right action is on people’s needs, understood either biologically and 
psychologically, on the one hand, or socially, on the other. My proposal is that 
an additional sort of human need, under-theorized in the African tradition, is 
existential. What we characteristically value is not merely physical and mental 
health and self-realization through service to society; in addition, we tend to 
want to accomplish things that merit esteem and admiration, and ideally by 
making differences that will outlive us, say, in the form of children, traditions, 
works of art, and perhaps even a philosophy essay.  
 If people’s dignity gives us moral reason to go out of our way to help 
them, then the help should include assistance in achieving what is particularly 
worth having in life, which includes meaning. And if part of caring about 
people’s good is indeed a matter of enabling them to live meaningfully, and if 
that includes understanding certain objective truths about humanity and the 
world in which we live, then it follows that we have some reason to promote 
some knowledge for its own sake. There is moral credit that goes to those who 
advance meaningful understanding of the general human condition, not merely 
to those who address “African social exigencies” (BALOGUN 2013, 52) or 
“the socio-political exigencies of the moment” (BALOGUN 2008a, 107), 
admittedly important as these are. 
 
Conclusion 
Having shown that there is some moral reason for philosophers (and other 
inquirers) to pursue some knowledge that is unlikely to be relevant to the 
current political-economic situation in Africa is not yet to answer conclusively 
the questions posed at the start of this article. Recall one of them: should a 
lecturer stop discussing with students whether the universe had a temporal 
origin? Even if learning about the origin of the universe were meaningful, and 
hence even if there were some moral reason to strive for that, Professor 
Balogun might suggest that there would be more moral reason for 
philosophers to address the current political-economic situation in Africa––
perhaps precisely because it would promote more meaning to do so.  
 Resolving this issue, about the various degrees of meaning available 
from various kinds of scholarly inquiries, is beyond the scope of this article. 
Its main aim has been to evaluate Professor Balogun’s arguments against 
knowledge for its own sake, and to weigh up the strongest one against a line of 
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thought that appears promising as a way to defend such knowledge, viz., the 
idea that one major point of philosophy is to foster meaning in people’s lives 
by advancing understanding the general human condition. I close this article 
by mentioning some additional issues that need to be discussed elsewhere in 
order to draw the firm conclusion that although philosophers can and should 
do more than they have to redress the poor human condition in Africa, that is 
not all they should do. 
 In order to know with real confidence that I should have written this 
very article––which is unlikely to make a (positive) practical difference in 
people’s lives!––we need to address the following issues in some depth. Can 
philosophers ever be in a position to save lives with their inquiries, and, if so, 
would that be the most meaningful sort? Even if there were a sort of 
philosophical knowledge that would be most meaningful for saving lives, how 
likely is it that we would discover it and that politicians (and other non-
philosophers) would put it to proper use? Are we instead much more likely to 
develop meaningful knowledge for its own sake, and, if so, might it therefore 
be most rational all things considered to pursue it? How do communal ties 
figure into the decision of what to study, in terms of either morality or 
meaning? For example, should one aid other colleagues who are pursuing 
knowledge for its own sake by helping them in their quest, or should one give 
to one’s society knowledge that would benefit it politico-economically? If one 
owes both groups to some extent, which one has the weightier claim, and how 
does that compare to one’s ability to benefit lots of foreigners who are even 
worse off? How much does it matter if people outside of academe cannot 
easily understand the sort of philosophical knowledge that is meaningful in 
itself? It would of course be most meaningful if they could and did understand 
it, but might their lives be somewhat more meaningful if humanity in general 
had access to this kind of knowledge, in the way that humanity can access 
quantum mechanics even if few can ever understand it? Finally, even if being 
a philosopher can foster some meaning in people’s lives, either practically or 
theoretically, would a change of career, to something more practical, be likely 
to foster much more meaning?  
Although these questions have yet to receive thorough answers from 
philosophers, it is an important virtue of Professor Balogun’s work, one of the 
few in the African tradition to consider issues of meaning explicitly, that it has 
occasioned awareness of them. As the reader can tell, I am inclined to think 
that his research is worth thinking about for its own sake, or else I would not 
have composed this article. I hope that, upon having reached the end of it, the 
reader agrees. 
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